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POSTSCRIPT 
 
ARISTOTLE IN AFRICA 
TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE AFRICANIST1 READING OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION  
 
Wim van Binsbergen2 
 
ABSTRACT. In this Postscript to the collection Truth in Politic: Rhetorical Approaches to 
Democratic Deliberation in Africa and beyond, the author argues that its project, while at first 
superficial glance appearing to deal with abstruse topics of limited applicability (a reading of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in terms of Aristotelian rhetoric), in fact 
addresses phenomena of the greatest significance for the African continent as a whole, thus 
taking up major debates in Quest over the years. These include: the reflection on the 
philosophical canon (in this case: Aristotle and rhetoric); the development of an African 
philosophy that is relevant to major current transformations on the African continent – in this 
case the viability of the state, democracy, reconciliation and freedom; that is critically and 
radically aware of the global hegemonic context in which it is being produced; and that yet 
situates itself, globally, in the field of tension between the universal and the particular. In this 
way, this Postscript both situates, and vindicates, the present collection, and offers a manifesto 
for Quest in the future. 
 
 
Introduction: Why this Postscript 
 
I whole-heartedly share the conviction of my fellow-editors (Philippe-Joseph 
Salazar and Sanya Osha), as to the quality and the relevance of this 
collection. Its project, i.e. seeking to elucidate contemporary African politics 
(and particularly the epoch-making 1994-1998 Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa) in the light of Aristotelian rhetoric, directly 
addresses the raison d’être of Quest as an African journal of philosophy. 
Especially in this first issue of Quest under my responsibility, I feel it is not 
out of character (to use an expression from Aristotle’s philosophy of virtue) 
for me to examine, in this Postscript, this collection as a coherent whole, and 
to highlight its dilemmas and solutions. I thus build on the shorter overview 
presented, in the Foreword, by Philippe-Joseph Salazar, who was the main 
intellectual and organizing force behind the conference on which the present 
1 Cf. the footnote on p. 7 of this volume.  
2 I am indebted to my fellow-editors Philippe-Joseph Salazar and Sanya Osha for constructive 
remarks on an earlier version of this argument. However, the responsibility for this argument’s 
shortcomings and one-sidedness is entirely mine. 
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collection is based. Far from disqualifying the various contributions in this 
volume for the specific disciplinary and geographical and temporal focus 
they each take, my aim is to bring out their potential to contribute to what, 
through major debates featuring some of the great names in African 
philosophy, have been the leading themes in Quest through the years:  
 
1. the reflection on the philosophical canon, both in the North Atlantic and 
in Africa (with possible extensions towards the world’s other philosoph-
ical traditions, in Islam, Judaism, India, China, the New World, etc.);  
2. the conceptual and theoretical effort to develop African philosophy into a 
tool that illuminates, by comparison and contrast, current socio-political 
developments on the African continent; 
3. the critical reflection on the North Atlantic dominated, hegemonic 
context in which African knowledge production takes place today, and 
the formulation of radical anti-hegemonic alternatives; and finally 
4. the exploration of the possibilities for an intercultural production of 
knowledge that, while affirming its specific (e.g. African) roots in space 
and time, yet situates itself in the field of tension between the universal 
and the particular. 
 
 Applying these themes to the present volume implies assessment, and 
therefore deviation from the editorial pretence of neutrality. Considering the 
seriousness of the matters we are dealing with, such may be inevitable. Even 
in a book centring on rhetoric, elegance cannot always take precedence over 
what is perceived (albeit from an individual standpoint) as relevance. While 
most authors in this collection prefer the Aristotle of Rhetoric,3 exploring 
(by Aristotle’s own definition4) the possibilities of persuasion, others feel 
more comfortable with the Aristotle of Organon,5 exploring the possibilities 
of arriving at a literal truth through formal procedures. The latter approach 
implies a more compelling, less malleable and less performative conception 
of truth than the former, even6 in intercultural matters like those at stake in 
this volume. The four objectives outlined above are full of contradictions, 
                                          
3 The locus classicus of rhetoric is, of course, Aristotle’s book of that name, available in a number 
of modern editions and translations, including: Aristotle 1926, 2001, 1991. In the present volume, 
the contributions particularly by Salazar, Cassin and Garver contain essential pointers to the main 
issues, and important classic and recent writings, in the field of rhetoric. For the application of 
rhetoric as an analytical tool in the South African context today, see the brilliant Salazar 2002. 
For an excellent recent collection also cf. Bernard-Donals & Glejzer 1998.  
4 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 1, 1355b26.  
5 Cf. Aristotle, Organon, numerous editions e.g. Aristotle 1938, 1960. 
6 van Binsbergen 2003b. 
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each in themselves and the four of them in their combination; so is 
contemporary Africa, South Africa, the relation between South Africa and 
the rest of the African continent; so is my own (and our contributors’!) 
personal and professional positioning in all these issues. It would be a 
miracle, indeed a rare feat of rhetoric, if we had managed to keep all these 
contradictions nicely tucked under the blanket of polite but superficial 
editorial apotropaic formulae (or of silence, which is even more polite).  
 Avoidance of critical elements would also have been counter-productive, 
considering the fact that from its inception Quest has boasted to be a context 
of philosophical discussions – which necessitates bringing out contradictions 
into the open, not in order to force them in a particular direction that happens 
to suit a particular author’s personal, political and disciplinary outlook, but 
so that they can be further addressed by regular and respectful debate. 
Therefore, this Postscript is not intended to overrule the preceding 
contributions with a last word of editorial power, but to honour them by 
initiating the discussion to which they, and the major issues they deal with, 
are entitled.  
 Indeed, considering the robust foundation of the present collection in a 
well-established philosophical tradition (that of rhetoric) which is gaining 
more and more in recognition and popularity in recent years, and in 
profound and unmistakable, responsible scholarly grappling with the 
democratic transformation of South Africa as one of the most significant 
processes affecting the African continent in recent decades, there is no 
reason why the debate to which the present collection seeks to contribute, 
should not already begin within the pages of the present collection, in this 
Postscript. In fact, that debate already started during this collection’s original 
conference. I was not there, but if I had been there, my paper and my 
contribution to the discussions would have been along the following, mainly 
constructive lines. Part of what I have to say, serves to bring across my own 
professional views of Africa to rhetoricians; but much of what I have to say 
is rather intended to elucidate, and vindicate, the rhetoric deployed in the 





The rhetorical tradition emerged nearly two and a half millennia ago in 
Ancient Greece, founded by the Sophists (foremost Protagoras), developed 
and formalized by Aristotle of Stagira, and further taken up by, among 
others, Cicero in Rome two centuries later. After a chequered existence in 
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subsequent centuries it recently received a new lease of life in the context of 
Nietzsche-inspired relativism and anti-foundationalism, postmodernism, 
globalization, and the proliferation of intercultural and transcultural 
communication settings. This volume’s arguments are inspired, not by the 
Aristotle of Organon but by the Aristotle with a keen sense of the practical 
negotiation of truth in concrete political deliberation – a practice he got to 
know inside-out as a Macedonian migrant spending much of his working life 
in distant Athens. Little surprisingly, Aristotle, like Plato,7 was rather critical 
of the dēmokratia of his time.8 Having participated in that city’s intellectual 
life for decades (the last twelve years as head of the Lukeion school), 
Aristotle finally became more or less democracy’s victim himself when, 
after his former pupil Alexander the Great’s death in 323, and, “lest Athens 
should sin twice against philosophy” (the first time being the judicial murder 
of Socrates in 399 BCE), our philosopher had to flee that glorious city for 
the Aegean island of Euboea, where he died within a year.9  
 The Stagirite’s ghost may rest in peace: given Alexander’s short life this 
time table forensically exonerates Aristotle from the Afrocentrist allegations 
to the effect that he stole the contents of his books from “Africa”, i.e. from 
the Ancient Egyptian temple academies (prw cankh, “houses of life”) 
subjugated through Alexander’s conquest of Egypt. Such allegations were 
initiated by the great USA Black emancipationalist Marcus Garvey (1887-
1940), subsequently elaborated by G.G.M. James,10 and since enshrined in 
the Afrocentric canon. Lefkowitz and Howe have convincingly refuted them. 
However, the well-informed initiator of the Black Athena debate, Martin 
Bernal, treats James’ allegations with considerable patience. And for some 
reason:11 although the specifics of an Egypt-Aristotle connection are 
extremely improbable, yet it is with the present state of scholarship simply 
undeniable that already before the Hellenistic amalgamation of West and 
East, the Ancient Near East including Egypt was a major source for the 
emerging Greek mythology, philosophy, science, technology, and aesthetics. 
The extent to which Ancient Egypt can count as an integral part of “Black”, 
sub-Saharan Africa is a different question, and one so complex and so highly 
politicized that we cannot treat it within the present, limited scope.  
 Therefore, whatever (pace Nethersole, this volume) the considerable 
                                          
7 Plato, Republic.  
8 Cf. Aristotle Politics (1932) IV (VI) 1, VI (VII) 1-8 ; Bierens de Haan 1943. 
9 McKeon 2001. 
10 James 1973. 
11 Lefkowitz 1994, 1996; Howe 1999. For the opposite view, see Bernal 1987-1991; cf. van 
Binsbergen 1996, 1997, 2000a, 2000b, where I identify as a moderate Afrocentrist myself. 
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merits of the Afrocentrist position in general, Africa cannot appropriate 
Aristotelian thought as if the latter could only be fully understood against an 
African background.12  
 Alternatively, however, much of the present volume would appear, if 
only at first and superficial glance, to revive the opposite, Eurocentric 
dream: the view that processes in contemporary Africa may be uniquely 
understood by the application of models of democracy, politics, rhetoric and 
public truth evolved (perhaps even initiated) in Ancient Greece, – the very 
same Ancient Greece that was alleged by Eurocentric identity construction 
from the 18th to the 20th century CE (and even in some passages in the 
present book – as if the Black Athena debate never took place) to be the 
unique cradle of European civilization, two and a half millennia ago.  
 With its reliance on rhetoric as a philosophical sub-discipline, this 
volume’s intellectual genealogy goes back directly to the origins of the 
Western philosophical tradition. This suffices to indicate the philosophical 
relevance of the present collection. Given the orientation of Quest: An 
African Journal of Philosophy, it is the African relevance that may still need 
to be argued, beyond the over-obvious point that South Africa (whose 1994-
1998 Truth and Reconciliation Commission – TRC – features centrally in 
this collection) is a part of Africa and that therefore the recent developments 
in that country are African issues. Beyond the wider issues enumerated in 
the four points above, this volume’s more specific, and especially 
comparative, Africanist relevance can be argued on at least two counts:  
 
                                          
12 This does not rule out that the Ancient Greek democratic structures, and their rhetoric, as 
described by Aristotle, originally may have sprung from a very wide-spread and ancient complex 
of pre-statal local democracy, in which local communities largely run their own affairs on the 
basis of the peer deliberations of local men in frequent assemblies from which women in 
reproductive age, children, and strangers, are excluded. Traces of this complex which may still 
found in rural communities all over the Mediterranean including North Africa. But in fact its 
distribution is much wider and includes much of rural Asia and rural Africa. In the latter 
continent (but in close parallel with, for instance, Ancient Germania) the man’s assembly – often 
included in a small local sacred forest area – is a common feature in many village environments, 
and the community process largely hinges on village moots. The complex is even found in the 
New World. Therefore it is likely to go back to the Upper Palaeolithic, like most cultural and 
linguistic Old-World communalities that are not due to recent globalization. From the bird’s eye 
perspective of the several millions of years of human cultural history, Ancient Athens and village 
Africa far from belong to totally different worlds. Bernal (1993) suggests specific Phoenician 
influence on the democratic patterns of Greek city states, but while this is in line with the general 
Asian and African formative influence on emerging Ancient Greek culture and society, it is – as 
usual with Bernal – too narrow an explanation in that it misses the point that Ancient Greece 
shared a common linguistic and cultural origin with many Asian and African societies even 
before the three components in this equation started to specifically influence each other.  
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a. the need for socio-political reconstruction throughout the African 
postcolony13 of the 1990s and 2000s, and 
b. the possibility that, despite the glorious transition to majority rule, and 
despite whatever healing and morale-boosting effects the TRC, the 
African Renaissance, and ubuntu may have had, South Africa since the 
advent of democratic majority rule in 1994 may yet have proceeded 
somewhat in the direction of becoming another African postcolony. 
 




The TRC and Africa (a): Reconstruction in the African postcolony? 
 
In the first place, myriad threads of demographic, linguistic, cultural and 
historical continuity link South Africa with the rest of Africa, and since the 
establishment of majority rule even South Africa’s social exclusion from 
that continent has been lifted. However, the wider comparative African 
applicability of the TRC case, and of a rhetorical approach to the TRC, as 
advocated in the present collection, goes further than this nominal point. 
Considering the global flow of information and political aspirations, it 
cannot have been by accident that the beginning of the end of apartheid in 
South Africa (Nelson Mandela’s release from long-term imprisonment in 
1990) followed shortly after the fall of the Berlin wall, and more or less 
coincided with massive national democratization movements elsewhere in 
Africa. These movements (to which Kouvouama’s contribution in the 
present collection refers) clamoured against the devastation of African 
postcolonial polities as a result of such national ills as constitutional 
unaccountability, large-scale corruption and embezzlement, illegal use of 
violence, capturing of the state by a minority defined in ethnic, region or 
class terms, etc.  
 The experiences of “the African postcolony” in the 1980s very clearly 
demonstrate that apartheid may be a sufficient condition to corrupt and 
destroy a state, but that it was, and is, not a necessary condition: other 
African states have collapsed, in the same period and more recently, due to 
the very different factors listed above. These processes have often acerbated 
in the 1990s, have combined with global pressures wrecking African 
national economies and facilitating civil war, and as a result in nearly a 
                                          
13 Cf. Mbembe 1992, 2001; Osha 2000; Werbner 1997; Comaroff & Comaroff 1999.  
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dozen African countries (out of just over fifty) the state now only exists on 
paper. There, the socio-political fabric is destroyed by internal strife and 
absence of consensus, and a national reconstruction comparable to what was 
envisaged in the TRC would be called for.  
 In the present collection, the contributions by Osha (Nigeria) and 
Kouvouama (Congo-Brazzaville) briefly explore this parallel between these 
two African countries, and South Africa under the TRC; but also other 
countries come to mind, e.g. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Congo-
Kinshasa, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Burundi, while a reconstruction process 
actually is going on in Rwanda and Uganda. Both authors go about their 
analysis in a remarkably un-rhetorical fashion: they identify themselves as 
African actors, and they parade, in their argument, other such actors who, in 
the democratization wave of the early 1990s and in Nigeria’s more recent 
return to democracy, insist on the literal, metaphysical and moral truth in 
politics, and on seeing that truth brought out and lived by in everyday 
political life. Also, both authors forego the chance of comparatively 
assessing, reversely, what the Nigerian and Congolese experiences could 
mean for our understanding of South Africa.  
 The very rhetoric explored in the present volume in itself aptly describes 
(in its dissociation of politics and ethics, in its view of truth as primarily the 
outcome of the skilful situational management of words) some of the main 
perversions of politics in the African postcolony – the kind of perversions 
the democratization wave of the early 1990s battled against throughout 
Africa. These perversions also seem to indicate some of the possible steps in 
what racialist opponents of African democratic majority rule in South Africa 
have always invoked as an doom scenario, notably that country’s possible 
transformation into a (special type of) postcolony: 
The key to Protagoras’ paradox here (“everyone has justice, and those who do no have it must 
be killed”) is the following: Everyone is just, even those who are not. They must pretend to be 
just and that is all they need to be just “in a certain way”. In affirming that they are just, they 
recognize justice as constitutive of the human community and by so doing justice itself is 
integrated in the city – in a way, it is the praise of virtue by vice that universalizes virtue 
(Cassin, this volume).  
 Plato failed, practically (in the Syracuse episodes, 367 and 361-360 
BCE) to install philosophers at the head of the state, just as he fails to 
convince, theoretically (in his Republic),14 that such would be a desirable 
arrangement. However, when philosophers/rhetoricians begin to articulate, 
as established socio-political practice and perhaps even as a form of social 
                                          
14 Plato 1975. Popper 1957 is a major and passionate critique of Plato’s position on this point.  
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virtue, the very sleight-of-hand in the public negotiation of truth for which 
politicians have been notorious for millennia, including modern African 
politicians, then we have a very different proposition from Plato’s, notably: 
philosophers who “tell it like it is” and who thereby may well deserve their 
seats next to the actual rulers: 
Protagoras’ analysis goes beyond being applicable to the TRC’s practice and the TRC as a 
model for deliberation within reconciliatory politics. It shows two things: Firstly, that 
repenting, the apology or the request of pardon, is that much less necessary since “the one 
who does not infringe justice is a fool”. (Cassin, this volume; italics added WvB) 
 African philosophers, including Hountondji, Gyekye and Osha,15 have 
spoken out vehemently against African politicians’ unconstitutional and, in 
general, unlawful use of power, and against the high levels of corruption that 
are usual in that context. While the rhetoric-based approach is undeniably 
realistic and illuminating as a description of practice, does it merely 
identify an evil to be exposed? or should it be considered to offer a model 
for emulation?  
 In the words of Philippe-Joseph Salazar, this collection’s emphasis on 
rhetoric has the explicit aim of contributing to the instruments that may 
enable South Africa to become and remain a viable democracy. Can we 
extend the application of rhetoric to postcolonial Africa as a whole? Let us 
realize that many Africans, including South Africans, and especially those 
outside the circle of elites controlling or at least exploiting the state and the 
economy, have a less cynical understanding of democratic politics than the 
one advocated by Protagoras. This is in fact a contrapuntal theme running 
through this entire collection, in complement to the element of a-moral 
verbal manipulation studied by rhetoric. In Garver’s words (this collection):  
On the other hand, and this seems to me the more interesting conclusion, the ultimate 
criterion for what counts as rational is an ethical criterion. 
And the same dilemma of moral truth that is capable of being transmuted, in 
the hands of politicians, into a usable, manipulative truth that no longer 
                                          
15 Hountondji 1991; Gyekye 1997; Osha 2004. It is important to note that these African 
philosophers condemn corruption and the abuse of power, not so much by reference to any 
traditional, precolonial African value or philosophical thought, but by cosmopolitan reference to 
such modern principles implied to be more or less universal: constitutional order, justice, and 
human rights. In Kouvouama’s words (this volume):  
But the Sovereign National Convention has also been a place of violent expression, 
where violent words condemned armed violence. In Paulin Hountondji’s opinion, 
speech, which is part of parliamentary culture, needs to be found not only within African 
cultures, i.e. palaver culture, but also within the French parliamentary culture of 1789, 
where speech was radical, exigent and rebellious. 
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unites but divides and excludes, informs Nethersole’s contribution, where 
(critically continuing the debate on the African Renaissance), she concludes 
that  
In the retrieval of the forgotten, hidden, masked and obscured stories, historical truth, as 
uncovered by the TRC for instance, can, imbued with moral justice, speak the truth to 
political power in relation to the excluded. In as much as the African Renaissance seeks to 
build an image of the African as one constructed by himself/herself and not by others for the 
purpose of building his/her own development with his/her own hands, the project is 
concerned, like the TRC, with historical truth. However, where the African Renaissance turns 
into identity politics in order to achieve political power, the historical truth is jettisoned for 
the sake of exclusivity. For truth as seen to be residing in identity is no longer plural, 
relational, and deliberative. Instead of being a “sensuous force” of exchange between diverse 
and distinct people who have to share the same country and the same, increasingly 
globalizing world, an undue emphasis upon the claim to ethnic, authentic identity is in danger 
of rendering the “coin” of truth into useless “metal”. (Nethersole, this volume)  
Rhetoric helps us to pinpoint some of the defects of the political situation in 
the African postcolony, and (when rhetoric is applied to a process of national 
reconstruction like the South African TRC) it clearly offers us perceptive 
insights into some of the remedying mechanisms.  
 
 
The TRC and Africa (b):The model of the African postcolony as a sword of 
Damocles hanging over democratic South Africa 
 
Meanwhile, in the second place, in addition to the possible application of the 
TRC model to other African countries, the new South Africa has been up 
against cynical, anti-democratic and racialist critics who have suspended the 
threatening model of the African postcolony over South Africa, and who 
cannot wait to see this sword of Damocles drop and destroy all that hope, 
heroism, generosity and hard work have built and are still building. So far 
they have been proven wrong, yet it is generally admitted that there are 
worrying tendencies in post-apartheid South Africa, in such respects as the 
eroding national consensus; the widening gap between generations, classes, 
and genders; the excessive crime rate; the oligarchization and primitive 
accumulation attending the partial Africanization of the elite; the progressive 
installation of a politics of make-believe (as in state pronouncements on 
HIV/AIDS); and the rigid (although inevitable, and democratically 
supported) control over the South African state by the ruling African 
National Congress (ANC).  
 Osha in his contribution explains why the equivalent of South Africa’s 
TRC could not work in a post-colony like Nigeria today, despite a return to 
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democracy: the new regime is too closely associated with the ancient regime 
than that it could afford “full disclosure” on TRC lines. But was the South 
African situation with the TRC really fundamentally different?  
 
 
When does disclosure bring catharsis?  
 
Did the TRC’s “full disclosure” bring the catharsis that was hoped for and 
that – many would deem – was indispensable for the country’s future? The 
fact that, traded off against “full disclosure”, the perpetrators of apartheid 
got away with amnesty without further incrimination or punishment, might 
lead one to suggest that also in the South African case there was – under 
comparable conditions of successfully established post-conflict democracy – 
a comparable kind of continuity with the evil past, a comparable 
impossibility of making a clean break, as in Nigeria. This is a crucial 
question to ask in relation to the TRC. If the answer would turn out to be 
affirmative, in the sense that the TRC (rather than constituting a cathartic 
break with the past) would be found to be primarily a manipulative cover-up 
of the past, then not only our image of the new South Africa would be 
tarnished, but also many of the rhetoric-inspired contributions in the present 
collection would have to be faulted for being over-optimistic and idealistic. 
We therefore will let the argument have its full contradictory course, before 
finally coming to a conclusion that confirms the TRC to be a fundamental 
and historic transformation of South African society – in fact (or so I will 
argue) the very birth of the South African nation – in, through such a 
conclusion, the value of the rhetoric approach will be highlighted. 
 First then, as from the devil’s advocate, some of the doubts which too 
positive a reading of the TRC would have to accommodate.  
 As stressed by Barbara Cassin in the present volume, in the TRC there 
was the nominal equivalent of the Ancient Greek isēgoria,16 the fundamental 
democratic right to speak; but what is the benefit of such speaking, when it 
only lifts the burden of not having spoken out from one’s pained heart, while 
one’s words – one’s disclosures and accusations – carry no effect in the 
sense of legal action being taken against the perpetrators? Does not such a 
right to speak amount, after the lifting of apartheid, to a new subordination, 
this time justified not by reference to alleged “racial”17 inferiority but by 
                                          
16 Albeit that, in ways that could have been acknowledged more explicitly in this collection, such 
a right was reserved to male free citizens, excluding women, slaves and foreigners (metoikoi), 
who together formed the great bulk of the Athenian population, and the heart of the economy. 
17 Contrary to such concepts as “class”, “caste”, “ethnic identity” etc., “race” is not a scientific 
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reference to the common good of living together peacefully? Is the common 
good consciously perceived by all South Africans, and by all in the same 
terms?  
 These are some of the questions I will consider in the following pages. 
For answers, it is simply not good enough to appeal (as our contributions 
frequently do) to Hannah Arendt’s notion of politics as “story-telling”, if we 
wish to bring out all the layers of power, agency and pain that are involved. 
Was the TRC’s “full (but repercussion-less) disclosure” perhaps a case of 
repressive tolerance, so that peaceful transition to democratic rule could be 
forced down the throat of the majority of the population, despite its long 
years of suffering and its pent-up indignation – thus leaving the country’s 
infrastructure and basic class structure largely intact, at the price of a 
substantial replacement of White by Black elites? For clarity’s sake: we are 
still in with the devil’s advocate, still in the process of setting up our 
argument’s props so that the final, positive conclusion can be reached (in the 
section of the nation’s birth pangs, below). I am not advocating that South 
Africa’s coming to terms with the perpetrators of apartheid should have 
been more revengeful and bloody. But if the frame of reference for such 
coming-to-terms appears to be one-sidedly set by the political desire to 
placate Christian,18 upper-class and White19 concerns, and to ignore the 
historic African tradition except by pressing into service the nice, forgiving 
                                                                                                                             
concept but, instead, a local collective representation, explicitly and consciously (in 
anthropological parlance, “emically”) used by members of specific societies in the past and at 
present in order to articulate and explain, among themselves, socially constructed difference. 
South Africa and the USA are among the few societies today where “race” functions as such a 
collective representation at the emic level, in the sense that it can still be used in polite 
conversation and in official expressions. Unfortunately, Afrocentrists have often copied this 
usage, even though it lies at the root of the very oppression they are battling against.  
18 As Doxtader quotes Tutu (1994: 223) in the present collection: 
The victims of injustice and oppression must be ready to forgive. That is a gospel 
imperative. (Italics added, WvB). 
Despite the presence of historic African and Asian expressions and the local growth of Islam, 
there is no denying that Christianity has established itself as the dominant public expression of 
spirituality in South Africa throughout all segments of the population. Considering that it was 
also invoked to justify apartheid, an appeal to Christian imperatives is not exactly without 
contradiction. But an important point, and I will repeat it throughout this article, is that 
Christianity never was the only spiritual expression in South Africa, especially not in the 
uncaptured recesses of private life, among people of African descent in rural areas and informal 
urban communities, and among Asian-derived segments of the population.  
19 As Osha quotes Tutu (1996: 43) in the present collection:  
in the matter of amnesty, no moral distinction is going to be made between acts 
perpetrated by liberation movements and acts perpetrated by the apartheid dispensation.  
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aspects of ubuntu,20 then how can one expect true cleansing and liberation 
from the past, genuine catharsis to have taken place? How can such a move 
be conceptualised? This is the central question I shall try to answer in this 
paper. The rhetoric-inspired analyses in the volume will help us greatly in 
finding the answer, but in the process we will have to add to them – at least, 
that was my impression – a conceptual analysis in terms of the varieties of 
transcendentalism and immanentalism, which help pinpoint the specific 
frame of thought, and the specific context of political organization 
(appreciably different from that of Ancient Greece and Rome), in which 
apartheid, as well as the TRC, can be more precisely situated.  
 Doubt that the TRC was effectively, and exclusively, about a catharsis of 
forgiving that was inevitably to take place, is not entirely absent in the 
present volume. Thus Samarbakhsh-Liberge points out the aporia that arises 
when, like in the case of the TRC, excessive emphasis on national consensus 
thwarts the formulation of profoundly unwelcome home truths – of which, 
of course, apartheid offered one interminable series. From Villa-Vicencio’s 
sensitive contribution we glean:  
I would rather offer the comment of a young woman named Kalu; it highlights the 
internalized emotions inherent to the transition from the old to the new: (...) 
What really makes me angry about the TRC and Tutu is that they are putting pressure on 
me to forgive (…). I don’t know if I will ever be able to forgive. I carry this ball of anger 
within me and I don’t know where to begin dealing with it. The oppression was bad, but 
what is much worse, what makes me even angrier, is that they are trying to dictate my 
forgiveness.  
Her words capture the pathos involved in the long and fragile journey towards reconciliation. 
No one has the right to prevail on Kalu to forgive. (Villa-Vicencio, this volume).  
 
“Pain is not an argument” 
 
This passage from Villa-Vicencio is one of the few instances in this 
collection where disloyalty is shown vis-à-vis an otherwise carefully 
maintained consensus among the contributors: the view that a person’s pain 
and sorrow do not constitute grounds for political, legal or historical 
consideration.  
 In the more technically rhetorical pieces, the position is advocated that 
                                          
20 While ignoring a major Southern African historic value, very much implied in ubuntu: the 
adamant refusal to give quarter to sorcerers – as the perpetrators of apartheid are from a 
traditional perspective, having indulged in a cult of power that transgresses the codes of 
humanity. Cf. van Binsbergen 2001.  
van Binsbergen 250
such consideration would rent the fabric of the political community – like 
the Athenians’ argument on amnesia and amnesty in 403 BCE, elegantly and 
illuminatingly analysed in this collection by Barbara Cassin, in the footsteps 
of Nicole Loraux. Such a position does not preclude even, apparently, a 
measure of technical admiration for the craftsmanship invested in the 
instruments through which pain and sorrow were inflicted:  
When Philippe-Joseph Salazar evokes the South African apartheid legislation, the Population 
Registration Act 30 of 1950, he rightly pitches his analysis at the level of language itself:  
One could admire the linguistic feats of the Lycurgus of Southern Africa (Salazar 
1998: 27).  
The South African Act is well and truly that of a “nomothete” which transforms the meaning 
of words... (Cassin, this collection). 
 Aristotle provides21 extensive discussions of emotions, and the political 
implications of his views have been receiving renewed attention recently.22 
It is not he who rules out emotions from the political domain. That they are 
yet largely absent from this collection,23 may be due to the fact that in this 
book Aristotelian rhetoric is often filtered through a remarkable combination 
of French rationalist thought (which ever since Descartes has had no room 
for emotions), and the more general North Atlantic tradition of positive law, 
where the impassionate and the objective represent lofty ideals, and contain 
the promise of a solution, a way out. Hence the paucity of references to the 
existential dimension of pain and suffering even in Hajjar’s excellent socio-
legal piece on torture as an aspect of, particularly, the suffering of the 
Palestinian people, in the present collection. The same view (“pain is not an 
argument”) is also manifest in Samarbakhsh-Liberge’s piece on the 
representation of history in the recent South African situation. Inspired by 
the millennia of suffering of the Jewish people, Jitay’s contribution comes 
perhaps closest to articulating the alternative view. He typically does so by 
reference to a long-ago situation (the destruction of the Temple of Solomon 
in 587 BCE), at a time when, and in a place where, politics and law had not 
yet completely fissioned into domains of their own to such an extent that 
they could already be thought of as (semi-)autonomous vis-à-vis religion, or 
                                          
21 Notably in his Nicomachean Ethics, and Rhetoric.  
22 Cf. Sokolon 2002, and extensive references cited there. 
23 Cf. Garver, this collection: 
but we still have to answer the political question of which feelings of pain deserve our 
attention. 
But his answer, however sympathetic, is in terms of a rationality away from pain.  
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vis-à-vis the everyday life of production and reproduction. For only when 
such complete fission is a fact, can the political domain pretend to be 
impervious to pain.  
 What, then, are the preconditions for such impermeability? Still slowly 
proceeding towards the promised, positive conclusion concerning the TRC’s 
significance, we will try identify these preconditions in the following 
discussion of transcendence in the statal domain.  
 
 
The transcendent state as a precondition for apartheid 
 
One of apartheid’s main justification strategies was its painstaking legalism, 
which added the pretence of utter legality to everything done in the name of 
apartheid, and to the format in which it was done. This has further enhanced 
tendencies already excessively developed in North Atlantic modern society: 
the reliance on the written word as an immensely powerful source of legal 
authority;24 on the constitutionally empowered institutions to create, 
maintain and legitimate (through words) such legal authority; and on formal, 
bureaucratically-organized organizations in which this word is carried out to 
become practice. Like its cousin, nazism, apartheid, with its illusory 
legalism, is not just a form of barbaric atavism and nothing more. Both 
forms of political perversion could only be a product of a modern, rationally 
organized, highly literate society, where the power of the written word 
carries the transcendence needed to be able to think and act beyond the here 
and now of personal relationships, beyond personal identification and 
charity based on face-to-face contact, in which the recognition of shared 
humanity is normally inevitable. Apartheid did not preclude condescending 
friendly relations between bosses and workers, between nannies and their 
charges; but neither did such relations preclude apartheid.  
 Transcendence is not a universal capability of human thought – on the 
contrary, it is a very specific mental stance which, although universally 
implied in the capacity of words to refer beyond the here and now, only 
comes to full fruition in concrete historical settings that are informed by 
writing, the state, an organized priesthood, and science. These institutions 
are achievements that, in human history, only emerged (in highly productive 
combinations) in the Ancient Near East c. 5,000 years ago. These institu-
tions have informed the thought and action of selected (especially literate) 
minorities of specialists in all continents including Africa in the subsequent 
                                          
24 Weber 1969.  
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millennia, endowing them with the capability of controlling (even 
vicariously and virtually, in their absence or after their death) socio-political 
situations, and of freely experimenting with thought, science and religion 
through the power of the abstract word. (In the most literal sense the word, 
and especially the written word, is mightier than the sword, for it is only the 
word that enables people to exercise command across vast expanses of space 
and time, whereas sheer violence is confined to the here and the now. 
Therefore, it is the word, not physical violence, that creates the trans-
cendence of states, although violence is an almost indispensable factor in 
maintaining such transcendence.) However, outside such specialist minority 
contexts, human thought and action have remained, in great majority, geared 
to the immanence of immediacy, personal experience, and the human scale. 
Only relatively exceptionally, through generalized literacy, extensive 
involvement in formal organizations (of the state, private enterprise, and 
religious, professional and recreational self-organization), and extensive 
conversion to formalistic, abstract participation in world religions, could this 
immanence significantly give way to transcendent stances among the 
majority of local populations. Cities and the formal sector are the world’s 
seats of transcendence. Villages and kin groups tend to remain the seats of 
immanence. Since human reproduction usually takes place in the intimate 
circle of kin groups, humans almost invariably start life as immanentalists,25 
only gradually learning language, which although usually limited to 
everyday immanentalist contexts, does opens the door towards writing, the 
state, the law, science, and God – in short, towards transcendence.  
 By implication, the dissociation of the political sphere from the 
productive and reproductive sphere is very far from a universal given, but 
occurs only in contexts where transcendence (notably, in the form of the 
state) is firmly established as a historical achievement.26  
                                          
25 There is nothing more immanentalist than the infant engulfed by its mother’s total presence. By 
the same token, there is nothing more transcendentalist than male attempts to conceal, through the 
power of their word, the fact that they lack the essential organs (uterus and breasts) of visible, 
undeniable reproduction. This suggests that a gender contradiction may often attend the 
contradiction between immanentalism and transcendentalism. Such a contradiction is very 
conspicuous in the creation stories of the Ancient Near East, which belong to the initial period of 
the emergence of writing, the state, organized priesthood, and science. In these stories’ most 
sophisticated recensions, male gods (such as Marduk, and YHWH) establish their right to rule 
through an act of creation, not from their own body or from that of the earth, but by the power of 
their word. Note that the immanently reproducing female (Tiamat, the earth, the snake, 
Leviathan) is such gods’ moral enemy, even if in the Genesis account of the creation of man an 
older, female dispensation still shimmers through. Cf. Fromm 1976: 231f; Pritchard 1969. 
26 Pace Cassin, who in her paper repeatedly assumes “the autonomy of the political” to be a 
universal given that may be invoked with the same confidence in the case of modern South Africa 
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 The apartheid state (with its abstract denial of the common, violence-
shunning humanity on which life in villages and kin groups tends to be 
based) is, even more than most other states, based on transcendence. Only 
under conditions of extremely entrenched transcendence is it possible to 
arrive at such a dissociation of the legal sphere and of the political sphere, 
that these spheres become totally impervious for the charitable and 
communicative values that usually inform the intimate spheres of production 
and reproduction.27  
 
 
The Ancient world’s limited relevance for an understanding of today’s issues  
 
Still on our way towards a conclusion on the TRC, and having made 
substantial progress, we will now make a slight diversion to argue a point 
that seems to counter some28 of the implications of the rhetoric-based 
contributions in the present collection: the Ancient world’s limited relevance 
for an understanding of today’s issues.  
 As stressed in Garver’s thoughtful contribution to this volume, Aristotle 
uses the concept of “friendship” to denote, with a term derived from the 
informal domestic sphere, a fundamental prerequisite which he attributes to 
the political sphere. Clearly, therefore, the dissociation between these 
spheres was considerably less developed in Aristotle’s time than it came to 
be in post-Renaissance Europe, when the rationality of the absolutist state 
made a claim to total transcendence, thus paving the way for such 
aberrations as the nazi state and the apartheid state.  
 The incomplete dissociation of the legal and the political spheres in 
Aristotle’s time – the basis of his political “friendship” – informs his 
rhetoric. It is the rhetoric of the assembly, before the same free males who 
only hours earlier found each other on the market-place, and who only hours 
later will re-adjourn in the gymnasium, in the public spaces of leisurely 
philosophical discussion, or in the seedy mature male comforts of banquets 
spiced up with willing boys and girls – banquets served and paid for partly 
                                                                                                                             
(on good grounds) as in the case of Ancient Athens (on far more dubious grounds).  
27 In principle, the transcendent (and violent) dissociation of the political sphere from the sphere 
of production and reproduction is typical of statehood in general, and has nothing to do with 
apartheid as such. For a detailed analysis of a precolonial South Central African state along such 
lines, cf. van Binsbergen 1992 and especially 2003d.  
28 By no means all, as is indicated by Garver’s sobering opening remark (this volume): 
Aristotle does not give solutions to contemporary political problems. He could not have 
imagined them, and so does not speak to them.  
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by slave labour. Only by taking Aristotle’s rhetoric out of that historic 
context, translating it into a modern Western Indo-European language, 
appropriating it by formalized, discipline-based (“transcendent”) scholar-
ship, assuming that it addressed political conditions comparable to those of 
modern statehood, and endowing it with a postmodern reservation vis-à-vis 
truth and institutional order, can we make Aristotelian rhetoric at home in 
the modern, transcendent state contexts of today. In a comparable way, 
Herodotus and Thucydides may be called the first historians yet no modern 
historian would academically survive if her methods and concepts were not 
fundamentally different from those of these two illustrious “founding 
fathers”; by the same token, the Olympic Games only in name, and 
nostalgically, revive an Archaic Greek custom going back to the eighth 
century BCE. By innovatingly applying Aristotelian rhetoric in a political 
context that is mainly in name (“democracy”) comparable with Aristotle’s 
elitist city-state, modern rhetoricians create (as is perfectly justifiable) an 
essentially new conceptual framework in order to illuminate (as the present 
volume beautifully demonstrates) the political aporias of today – while 
endowing that framework with the illustrious genealogy that its rootedness 
in Aristotle’s writings can provide.  
 Inherent in this intellectual trajectory is the difficulty modern rhetoric 
will have to appreciate that the transcendent power of the modern state 
cannot be relegated, for the full one hundred percent, to the dextrous 
performance of political oratory and other strategies illuminated by rhetoric. 
Such strategies continue to play a major role (as modern media research 
indicates, referred to in this volume by Rossouw’s piece), but instead of 
being responsible for creating, praxeologically, the entire political space an 
actor may have, they only serve to assert and actualize such political space 
as that actor already, transcendentally, derives from the letter of the law, 
from political and legal institutions. The praxeology, the dramaturgy and the 
aesthetics of verbal contests of rhetoric, and the generation of power in such 
contexts as a mere dextrous display of individual agency (as analysed in the 
present volume by the Nigerian scholar Ige for Cicero’s Catilinarian 
orations) tends to be only one side of the medal – the other, necessarily 
complementary side being established, institutionalized legal authority in the 
Weberian sense.29  
 In the wake of recent Ciceronian scholarship which he cites, Ige presents 
                                          
29 Weber 1969. For a recent argument on the limitations of agency and the remaining need for a 
structural and institutional analysis, in the context of African national states and traditional 
leaders today, see van Binsbergen 2003c.  
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the famous case of Cicero’s four orations against Catiline as a mere verbal 
contest along rhetorical lines between two individuals, Cicero and Catiline, 
who are alleged to be essentially each other’s exact match. Bringing only 
Cicero’s own text to support this reading (and Cicero is one of the founders 
of rhetoric; however, there is also Sallust’s contemporaneous account of this 
episode) leads Ige to depart from the traditional reading of the case. The 
latter has largely been in terms of the challenge of  
 
• a recognized social and political misfit who made a mess of his military 
commission, had a sex scandal involving a most sacred Vestal virgin, and 
otherwise was involved in such unsavoury court cases as to be even 
ineligible to put himself up as a candidate for the exalted state office of 
consul (Catiline), by  
• one of the two recognized supreme officers of the state (Cicero) 
deploying – not only his oratorical skill but especially his formal legal 
powers as invested in his exalted office.  
 
 Rhetoric does help us understand the taxonomics and the dramatics, the 
deployment of words and gestures, in such a contest, in other words to see 
how the letter of the legal word is turned into actually exercised socio-
political power. But despite these helpful pointers, the question remains: Do 
the praxeological dynamics captured by rhetoric need an indispensable basis 
of institutionalized legal authority, or can they create power fully at their 
own impetus? Perhaps rhetoric was actually more autonomously effective in 
Cicero’s time (when the Roman Republic was collapsing after half a 
millennium) than (under conditions of far more developed trancendentaliz-
ation of the state) in the England of Margaret Thatcher (pace Calder in this 
volume), and perhaps (as Ige perceptively suggests, and as can be further 
articulated in terms of my notion of immanentalism) there is, in this respect, 
a parallel between Cicero’s Rome and a contemporary African postcolonial 
state threatened by a military coup d’état.  
 It is time, however, to terminate our excursion into the Ancient world, 




What the immanentalist domain brought to the TRC  
 
In this connection, let us first pose an utterly, but (see below) understandably 
forbidden question in the South African context: “To what extent did the 
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population of South Africa constitute ‘one nation’ under apartheid, and to 
what extent was it really one nation that came to the TRC to be healed (and 
to be healed by whom, and by what)?”  
 Drawing on parallels in Greek Antiquity when the Athenian nation was 
divided over the differential response (collaboration or patriotism) to the 
attacking foreign force from Sparta, or proclaiming that the TRC was really 
about “how to heal a nation”, etc. – all this begs the question as to whether 
South Africa was arguably one nation under apartheid. The aporias of the 
apartheid state play us tricks here and prevent us from giving an 
unequivocal answer to this question. Apartheid legislation, pass laws, the 
creation of bantustans, were all based on the malicious, paper-thin 
(“transcendent”) fiction that only Whites were the lawful citizens of South 
Africa, and that all others belonged to other nations. The rhetoric (in the 
vulgar sense) of “Two Nations” or of a multiplicity of nations was the stock-
in-trade of White minority discourse in South Africa and South Central 
Africa throughout the twentieth century CE, replicated in book titles, 
journalistic products etc.; even the designation “rainbow nation” for the 
democratic, new South Africa (evocative of a plurality of colours, castes, 
“races”, somatic appearances) still appears to carry a distant echo of such 
usage. Against this background, admitting that South Africa was not one 
nation under apartheid would imply siding with the very forces of 
apartheid. But alternatively, affirming that it was a nation even under 
apartheid, would amount to a somewhat unrealistic denial of the gross 
constitutional and socio-economic inequalities, and of the resulting 
exclusion and humiliation to which the vast majority of that alleged “nation” 
was subjected.  
 At any rate, clearly the main purpose of the TRC was to make South 
Africa much more of a nation. Provided we define what we mean, the idiom 
of healing is not inappropriate here. Healing may well be defined as the 
process of catalytically facilitating the transition from a defective state to a 
state of greater completeness: thus, in this connection, from not-yet-a-nation 
to more-of-a-nation, or to nationhood, tout court. Much like a sangoma 
(Southern African diviner-priest) may be said to “heal a person” spiritually 
by bringing a human being who is too damaged to count as a full person, 
into contact with such symbols, words, arguments, images for identity and 
emulation, and by inducing her (or him) to engage in such rituals and 
concrete practical acts, that she can finally become the person she could not 
yet be before.30 
                                          
30 Archbishop Tutu presided over the first ever meeting TRC hearing under a huge banner whose 
Aristotle in Africa: A comparative Africanist reading of the TRC 257
 Let us now try to cast some more light on what, outside the 
transcendental state, would be the informal, immanentalist sphere of 
everyday life of production and reproduction – where pain is very much an 
argument – , a sphere which some victims and survivors cannot have failed 
to bring to the TRC.  
 In the comparative Africanist perspective we have become aware, since 
the late 1970s, of the differential degrees in which the modern, transcend-
entalist central state has actually been able to capture the lives and the minds 
of its citizens in African contexts. Empirical studies of state penetration have 
shown that, especially in rural areas and in informal urban communities, 
state penetration is usually the case to a limited extent only.31  
 These findings carry an important message for South Africa as, 
primarily, another African country. One of the most conspicuous, and 
deceptive, features of the South African situation is that the state, and 
modern formal organizations in government, services, industry, religion, 
sports, etc., are so well established and have such a grip on public life, that 
(for risk of ridicule and anger, and also for the more internalized sanctions 
that attend collective representations, i.e. a community’s socially-
constructed self-evidences) it is difficult to think of South Africa in other 
terms than as a fully-fledged modern country, – a country that happens to be 
in Africa but that should really be counted in the ranks of the North Atlantic 
region, or of Australia and New Zealand (where, however, somatically 
conspicuous descendants of the pre-conquest population, and their cultures, 
are – already for sheer numbers – much less visible in the public life than is 
the case in South Africa). It appears to be almost impossible (also for those 
reflecting on the South African socio-political order in writing, as Southern 
African intellectuals – perhaps with the exception of left-wing anthropol-
ogists) to see through the illusion of the transcendent, self-evident order 
which this state of affairs engenders, and to entertain, instead, an awareness 
of immanentalist alternatives: of people who (despite the unusual – but 
manifestly failed – insistence on the part of the apartheid state on 
penetrating into, and controlling, all aspects of life) do not consciously 
pattern their life and their self-identity in terms of that transcendent order. 
                                                                                                                             
central text read “HEALING OUR PAST”. The choice of words is remarkable: one may attempt to 
heal people, even a nation, from the undesirable effects of the past, but healing something as 
virtual as the past itself can only amount to the attempt to change the past, which is not in the 
nature of things; or to change whatever is painful in the representation of the past, which is where 
rhetoric comes in. Picture at: http://www.megastories.com/safrica/rainbow/finals/truth.htm. 
31 Bratton 1980; Cliffe et al. 1977; Geschiere 1984; Hyden 1980; Hyden & Bratton 1992; van 
Binsbergen et al. 1986. 
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Here I am referring to people who do not see themselves primarily as 
citizens of the state and participants in the national economy, who are 
largely strangers to that order and its highly specific procedures,32 but who 
instead define themselves in much more idiosyncratic and local terms; and 
who primarily pursue the symbolic projects proper to their own idiosyncratic 
local horizons rather than the symbolic projects of the state, national politics, 
industry, and mass consumption.  
 Treating the whole of South Africa as effectively one nation has the 
advantage of avoiding the trap of fragmenting divisiveness which the 
apartheid state has dug, but has the disadvantage of denying and muting of 
these centrifugal idiosyncrasies.  
 In my cultural analyses of modern Southern African societies, especially 
their urban sectors, I have often found it illuminating to depict the situation 
of historic local culture as one of “having gone underground” – an imagery 
akin to that of uncapturedness (Hyden). It is not that such cultural 
knowledge, and the related practices, have been completely eclipsed by the 
onslaught of the modern state, education, world religions, the capitalist 
economy, urbanization, globalization, consumerism etc. It is rather that the 
latter complex of forces has created a context in which expressions of 
historic local culture (such as the allegiance to puberty rites, ancestral cults, 
High God cults, beliefs and practices relating to sinister aspects attributed to 
the unseen – witches, familiars, ghosts – , traditional healing, traditional 
leadership, clan structures) are no longer socially permissible, can no longer 
be negotiated to the public domain (except perhaps in some highly 
                                          
32 The present collection offers an interesting case (in the contribution by Collier and Hicks) of 
what happens when, taking for granted the utter transcendence of the modern state, procedures of 
deliberation are introduced there that have no roots in immanent, everyday local experience. 
When after the lifting of fascism in Portugal in 1974 CE municipal assemblies adopted Robert’s 
Rules to structure their internal deliberations, this disadvantaged many of the local delegates 
because these formal procedures, which USA Army General Roberts had derived from USA 
Congress procedure in the late 19th century, were bewilderingly alien to them. The case is doubly 
instructive, because, as affirmed USA intellectuals of the late 20th century CE, the authors from 
whom this example is derived do themselves not even seem to realise the element of cultural 
alienness involved here: planting an Anglophone nineteenth-century North American ruling-class 
set of procedures into a Lusitophone twentieth-century popular Southern European environment. 
Those bewildered in this case became disadvantaged strangers to the political culture they were 
supposed to carry. We must not assume that the rules and the stakes of the democratic process are 
the same everywhere and at all times, and immediately obvious to all participants. In most North 
Atlantic countries democracy as representative government through universal franchise is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, less than a hundred years old; it had to be learned from scratch, in 
ways that differed only slightly, in scope and in time scale, from the ways in which very similar 
democratic procedures had to be learned by most Africans in the main wave of Independence 
around 1960, or by South Africans other than Whites in the early 1990s (van Binsbergen 1995). 
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fragmented, folklorized, commodified form), without serious negative 
sanctions for the social actors involved, in terms of ridicule, shame, 
suspicion, allegations of backwardness, of tribalism, of satanism, etc.33 
 The same factors that caused these centrifugal expressions to go 
underground and to be banned from the public space, have led to their 
conspicuous absence from mainstream scholarship in South Africa, 
including that addressing the TRC.  
 
 
The TRC as a nation’s birth pangs  
 
On the other hand, if one does acknowledge these centrifugal, immanentalist 
elements (of a linguistic, cultural, ethnic, religious, and lifestyle nature), and 
if one accepts that they are especially to be found among the South African 
people of African and Asian background who were the principal victims of 
apartheid, then one must inevitably acknowledge34 that different people 
brought very different things to the TRC.  
 The TRC was, therefore, not a well-defined arena where (in ways open 
to transparent rhetorical analysis) some already established ritual of “healing 
the nation through full disclosure and amnesty” could be effectively staged 
along lines that were clear to all participants, and on which they all agreed. It 
was primarily (but also that seems to be something rhetoric can handle) a 
place of utter confusion, staged by people who (as literates, as citizens 
conscious of their constitutional responsibilities, as academics, as adherents 
of world religions) identified with the idea of the transcendent state after the 
imported North Atlantic model, and who saw it as their main task to usher 
into greater allegiance to that model, those for whom the transcendent state 
was far less self-evident: those who were entertaining the centrifugal, 
idiosyncratic, implicitly African and Asian, orientations indicated above, and 
whose main life experience with the state had almost destroyed them, to 
                                          
33 Cf. van Binsbergen 1993, 2001, 2003b espec. chs 5 and 6. 
34 As implied, albeit not with specific reference to the TRC, by Collier & Hick, this volume: 
Many political disagreements now seem to be rooted in much “deeper” differences than 
conflicts of interest. As the cultural and religious diversity of the citizenry grows, 
through both migration and enfranchisement, the diversity of collective aims, moral 
outlooks, received knowledges, and worldviews grows. It is no longer reasonable to 
assume that a shared moral and political framework exists to guide public deliberation 
and debate. As the new social movements have demonstrated, the political vocabularies 
used to frame issues and propose solutions as well as the legitimacy of extant procedures 
for resolving political conflicts, are often the source, rather than the cure, of political 
disagreement.  
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boot, being apartheid’s designated targets and victims.  
 It now finally becomes possible to state what, beyond the content-less, 
truth-less game of rhetoric (but in a formulation that owes a lot to this 
volume’s rhetorical analysis – including the occasional remarks on sacrifice 
scattered there), and beyond the preservation of White, Christian and elite 
interests (but in a formulation that also owes a lot to Christianity), may have 
constituted the true stakes and the true heroism of the TRC: 
 Of course, the past was not healed. Neither was the nation healed, 
certainly not in the way Tutu suggested (notably, by speaking out without 
negative consequences for the perpetrators). No, the nation was born. 
Speaking out was no longer the issue. Pain resides, and is domesticated and 
healed, at a profound inner level where words scarcely penetrate.35 People 
who had no reason at all to trust the state, in whatever trappings, yet showed 
themselves generous and courageous enough to prefer the perpetrators’ 
undeserved amnesty to civil war. The victims and survivors thus sacrificed 
such revenge as they were entitled to. They could only hope to heal 
themselves through the act of such generosity – but also, in this very act, 
they effectively created the nation of South Africa for the first time. In doing 
so, they extended to the perpetrators of apartheid once more the humanity 
which the latter had lost by denying it to their victims. And thus the victims 
and survivors who spoke during the TRC, affirmed their own humanity 
(ubuntu), which is the moral hub of any nation, any political system worth 
considering.  
 What a huge moral and constitutional responsibility this generates for 
South Africa’s current majority government! What a package for 
Aristotelian rhetoric yet to accommodate in its attempts to make itself 
relevant to the world today!  
 
 
Counter-hegemonic challenge as a principal task for African intellectuals  
 
This collection’s rhetoric-inspired reading of the TRC seems to be based on 
the assumption that the Aristotelian rhetorical perspective, increasingly 
popular again in recent years, is so universal and so perennial that applying 
it to contemporary South Africa is neither an anachronism, nor a distortion, 
nor an act of naïvety, nor a hegemonic imposition. Depending upon one’s 
                                          
35 Here we touch upon a major shortcoming of current, main-stream political analyses: their lack 
of appreciation of the deeper, subconscious or unconscious levels of the political actors’ 
personality as a determinant of political behaviour. For attempts at remedy, cf. Gay 1985; Fromm 
1973.  
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epistemological and political position in the intercontinental construction of 
knowledge, however, the project of analysing contemporary South Africa 
through the spectacles of Aristotelian and Ciceronian rhetoric would not be 
entirely impervious to such allegations, however much the integrity and the 
scholarship of the authors involved are beyond doubt – and however much, 
as we will see below, such allegations can be countered by an higher-order 
intercultural philosophical argument.  
 We have already touched on historical reasons of specific differences in 
political structure, for taking a somewhat more relative view of the relevance 
of Ancient Greek and Roman models for present-day issues. But there are 
also important epistemological and knowledge-political reasons which – far 
more than the historical ones – relate to the very raison d’être of Quest: An 
African Journal of Philosophy.  
 In the course of the twentieth century CE, main-stream North Atlantic 
philosophy has largely given up the idea of the possibility of a privileged 
vantage point36 from where to overlook the world and mankind objectively, 
dispassionately, and authoritatively.37 Aristotelian rhetoric, or main-stream 
Western philosophy in general, cannot be claimed to be such a vantage point 
any more, – but neither can, of course, any other intellectual perspective that 
is brought to bear on the issues at hand, including African philosophy, 
African political science, African Studies in general. The point is not to deny 
the validity of any particular perspective, including Aristotelian rhetoric, but 
to deny any perspective’s claim to a monopoly over validity.  
 Meanwhile, especially with regard to Africa, universalist claims 
emanating from the North Atlantic tradition cannot fail to arouse deep-
seated sensitivities. It is only two centuries ago that Hegel – still considered 
a giant of the Western philosophical tradition, usually without further 
questions being asked – denied Africa a proper place in the history of 
mankind; and less than half a century since the prominent British historian 
Trevor-Roper expressed himself in similar fashion.38 Ever since the 
                                          
36 Popularly referred to as “the Archimedean point”, although this was meant, by Archimedes, as 
a mathematico-physical, not as an ontological, construct.  
37 For a Foucaultian critique of this illusion, based on the concept of genealogy (which is 
ultimately Nietzschean), see: Rabinow 1984; Foucault 1977. Cf. also Kimmerle 1985; and: 
Nietzsche 1887. The impossibility of an epistemological Archimedean point is also argued in: 
Rorty 1979; and from a totally different point of view in: Putnam, 1978, 1981. Such 
impossibility, in other words, is a received idea in contemporary philosophy.  
38 Hegel 1992; for a critical distance from the perspective of contemporary intercultural 
philosophy, cf. Keita 1974; Kimmerle 1993; Verharen 1997; also Eze 1996, 1997b. H.R. Trevor-
Roper, then Regius Professor of History at Oxford, United Kingdom, soon to be knighted Baron 
Dacre of Glanton, said in a Britsh Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) television broadcast in 1963: 
van Binsbergen 262
Renaissance, Europe has constructed its own exalted image of itself by 
contrasting it with a correspondingly negative image of Africa and its 
inhabitants – the Invention of Africa (Mudimbe) has amounted to the 
construction of North Atlantic identity, culture, history, science, philosophy, 
religion, and statehood, by denying these same achievements to Africans.39 
The denial and the suppression of African knowledge, initiative, dignity, 
language, culture and identity were ubiquitous aspects of the colonial 
experience in Africa, including post-conquest South Africa, and of White 
racialism vis-à-vis persons of African descent in Europe and the New World. 
Needless to say, the inhabitants of the other continents received very much 
the same treatment at the hands of Europeans and of the latter’s descendants 
in the Americas. Complementing Mudimbe, South Asia particularly has 
produced its own highly illuminating and highly indignant reflection on 
these processes, in the form of Postcolonial Theory, where “hegemony” and 
“the subaltern” are key concepts.40 In the present collection, only Nethersole 
makes reference, dismissively, to this set of ideas, however much they form 
the obvious context to look at formerly colonized societies. And even41 
Africanist anthropology, which through its elaborate methodologies of 
fieldwork would claim to have avoided the violence of representation that is 
otherwise inherent to North-South knowledge construction, could be argued 
to have fallen into the same hegemonic subordination of Africans and their 
life worlds.  
 
 
Intercultural knowledge between universalism and particularism  
 
One cannot simply send Aristotle, without elaborate preparation and protect-
ion, into such a global mine field, and trust that he will escape unscathed.  
                                                                                                                             
Perhaps in the future, there will be some African history to teach. But, at present there is 
none: there is only the history of the Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness, like the 
history of pre-Columbian America, and darkness is not a subject for history (published 
in Trevor-Roper 1965). 
However, in extenuation we may plead, firstly, that Trevor-Roper here expressed himself – in the 
best tradition of British empiricist scholarship – on the then unavailability of high-quality African 
historiography rather than (like Hegel did) on the ontological impossibility for Africans to have 
history or histories; and, secondly, that one of his students has been Terence Ranger, who became 
a great historian of Africa, contributing to the creation of precisely what Trevor-Roper claimed 
did not yet exist.  
39 Mudimbe 1988, cf. 1994.  
40 Cf. Bhabha 1986, 1995; Rattansi 1994; Spivak 1987, 1988, 1990. 
41 This is the Leitmotiv in: van Binsbergen 2003b.  
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 The present argument provides, inter alia, such preparation and 
protection. For there is one attractive perspective under which the 
rhetoricians’ appeal to Aristotle in order to illuminate current South African 
conditions need not be hegemonic nor suspect, even though Europe has 
constructed itself by monopolising the Ancient Greek heritage, and by 
dissimulating the fact that this heritage in itself was greatly indebted to Asia 
and Africa.  
 Philosopher of science Sandra Harding42 has cogently argued that the 
claims of modern, North Atlantic dominated, science of being objective, 
rational, and universal, are largely a myth springing from the fact of North 
Atlantic actual hegemony. Largely – but not entirely, and after elaborate 
attempts to argue the opposite, she has to admit that, especially in the natural 
sciences, the truth claimed by science is at least partly justified, i.e. is at 
least partly underpinned by the validity of its epistemological procedures, 
independently from such power as the North Atlantic region is capable of 
investing in its science, or is capable of deriving from its science. Identifying 
with women in science, and with people in science other than from the North 
Atlantic region, Harding sees this conclusion as a reason for hope and as 
empowerment for these long excluded groups. By contrast, yielding to the 
postmodern tendency towards complete fragmentation and relativism (as if 
anything else were a suspicious Grand Narrative in Lyotard’s sense)43 she 
sees as unacceptable disempowerment: as if global scientific knowledge, 
long wielded by North Atlantic males as their main source of power, all of a 
sudden has to be declared useless and merely local, an ethnoscience among 
myriad others at the very moment that previously excluded groups begin to 
gain access to such knowledge.  
 Harding’s argument exemplifies the tension of universalism (“Aristotle 
is universally applicable and universally illuminating”) versus particularism 
(...“but only with regard to Ancient Greece and not to Africa today”...), 
between which intercultural scholarship situates itself.44 Many centuries of 
scholarly transcendentalism have made it utterly uncomfortable for us as 
globally-orientated modern intellectuals to live (at least, to live 
professionally) with what yet makes up the standard experience of social life 
and what is practically accommodated as such in the immanentalism of 
informality: contradiction. In the quest for consistency at the level of words, 
we are inclined to try and lift the contradiction by destroying either of the 
                                          
42 Harding 1997; cf. van Binsbergen 2002. 
43 Lyotard 1979. 
44 Cf. van Binsbergen 2003b.  
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two poles between which it is stretched and creates tension. Our very 
difficult task however, when seeking to make sense of the complex 
phenomena of our global life world by bringing to bear upon them points of 
view and modes of thought from a plurality of life worlds belonging to 
different locations in space and time, is not to destroy the contradiction, but 
to make the best of it, indeed to thrive by it, in an act of balancing and 
negotiation. In this specific case this means both qualifying Aristotle’s 
alleged universality, and yet identifying the specific conditions under which 
his thought would be illuminating beyond Ancient Greece, even when 
applied to Africa today. Lest North Atlantic scholars be suspected that what 
they have cherished for centuries while they could still monopolize it, loses 
its attraction for them now that they have to share it intercontinentally, let 
them not throw Aristotle out at the very moment in history when African and 
Asians have gained the scholarly access to expertly read, criticize and apply 
Aristotle.  
 And let African and Asian scholars act in the same spirit. If “The master 
of those who know”45 can be seen as part of mankind’s shared, global 
heritage of thought, then there is no reason why he should not be applied to 
African conditions. But then, of course, it can also be admitted that the great 
gap that separates Athens and the TRC in time and space, realistically 
requires major adaptations, as well as an awareness of genuine differences. 
In an inclusive, global perspective Aristotle’s thought could not remain un-
adapted, let alone that it could be thought of as sacrosanct and all-
explaining. Therefore, the application of Aristotle in a contemporary African 
context could never be a one-way process, conducted by scholars who know 
all about Aristotle, nearly all about formal legal texts as produced in formal, 
bureaucratic legal settings under the aegis of the transcendent state – and 
virtually nothing about the life worlds, the cosmologies, the languages, 
kinship systems, political and legal institutions, day-to-day struggles, 
pastimes, religious, artistic, culinary, sexual expressions, etc., of the African 
people whose life is greatly affected (but far from completely determined – 
my refrain of centrifugal immanentalism again) by such formal settings. 
Considering the sensitivities attending the situation, the suggestion of 
another hegemonic assault, this time in the name of Aristotle and rhetoric, 
must be avoided at all cost. Hence this Postscript.  
 In other words, from the same inclusive, global perspective, the 
continued relevance of African models for African life, and the potential 
                                          
45 Dante, La Divina Commedia, Inferno IV: 131, referring to Aristotle: 
‘...’l maestro di color che sanno’. 
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relevance of comparative Africanist models, not only to other parts of Africa 
but also to the rest of the world, need also be admitted, and explored in 
concrete terms.  
 
 
Learning from the rest of Africa in order to better understand South Africa  
 
The point is, therefore, not that the contributors to this volume (which, as is 
relevant at this point, contains one of the most subtle recent analyses of 
intercultural communications and deliberations, in the contribution by 
Collier and Hicks) should be faulted for advocating a rhetoric-based 
perspective; the point is that they have just left it to others to sort out how 
such a perspective could be combined with other valuable perspectives such 
as the anti-hegemonic and comparative Africanist one. Considering the great 
investments of expertise and experience already needed to cover one field of 
scholarship, such an academic division of labour is perfectly acceptable, 
provided other disciplines, other perspectives, other political commitments, 
other identities, move in, in order to complement and complete what 
rhetoricians on their own disciplinary impetus cannot adequately cover or 
represent.  
 What could we learn then, finally, if we complemented a rhetorical 
perspective with a comparative Africanist one?  
 
a. It would bring us to explore the specifically African forms of rhetoric, 
such as employed in traditional African polities and in African traditional 
courts of law (also, albeit in modified form, in South Africa), and would 
throw additional light on the modalities of story-telling and of public 
construction of truths that constituted the TRC exercise.46  
b. It would allow us to identify and study, in addition to the Christian 
models informing Archbishop Tutu’s TRC frame of reference, and the 
Athenian models informing Salazar’s, Cassin’s and Garver’s rhetorical 
analyses of reconciliation in the present book, specifically African forms 
of reconciliation, and appreciate that these have constituted, for 
centuries, “African technologies of sociability” of great and proven 
effectiveness.47 If such models were not explicitly mobilized in the TRC 
                                          
46 African rhetoric: Cf. Bloch 1975; Knowles-Borishade 1991; Finnegan 1970. Also cf. Comaroff 
1975, for traditional oratory in the South African context; van Binsbergen c.s. 2003a, with 
extensive bibliography, for recent studies of traditional leadership and customary law in Africa; 
Oomen 2003 for an insightful study of South African rural local courts today.  
47 Van Binsbergen 1999, revised version incorporated in van Binsbergen 2003b: 349-374; cf. van 
Binsbergen 2003b: Introduction, pp. 32f.  
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exercise, they may yet have been implied in what some of the victims 
and survivors brought to its sessions.  
c. It would have made us realize that the widely attested failure of the 
Westminster model of parliamentary democracy throughout postcolonial 
Africa suggests deep-seated structural incompatibilities. In view of our 
argument so far, we can now suggest that these incompatibilities have to 
do with the impossibility of planting a modern state in a local context so 
saturated with immanentalism that the transcendence of the state finds 
insufficient support there (mainly, but not exclusively, because of a 
difference in mode of thought, but also for historical reasons: because of 
the pain which earlier experiences with the state have inflicted). This 
would make us think twice before arguing, as a matter of course and as 
an automatism, the obvious applicability of the original, Athenian model 
of democracy, or of the modern Westminster model, to South Africa, as 
another part of Africa. In particular (since evidently, these 
incompatibilities exist at the level of socio-political structure, not of 
individual innate ability) it would force us to reflect on the structural 
preconditions for transcendence (through effective and prolonged 
participation in a viable state and in viable formal organizations – in such 
fields as health services, education, religious life, sports and other 
recreations – , high and sustained levels of literacy, effective divulgation 
of modern cosmopolitan science), and to direct citizenship training 
accordingly.  
d. It would have made us explore – in addition to the Athenian democratic 
model which has been effectively (albeit at the price of considerable 
misrepresentation) appropriated by the North Atlantic tradition (and 
which, therefore, is difficult to detach from Eurocentrism) – historic 
African ways of going about democracy, popular participation, social and 
political justice, constitutional law, dating from before the imposition of 
the transcendental colonial state, and in part surviving (in more or less 
adulterated, neo-traditionally encapsulated, and perverted, forms) in the 
niches of the colonial and the postcolonial state. Africanist political 
anthropology (some of whose finest classic products48 happen to deal 
with Southern Africa) and African philosophy (including the ubuntu 
variant) have done much to put these African political forms and 
conventions on the map. We cannot simply ignore their existence. 
Neither can we simply take for granted that in the national reconstruction 
of post-apartheid South Africa such African elements are necessarily 
                                          
48 Gluckman 1958, 1969; Krige & Krige 1943; Kuper 1969; Schapera 1938, 1943, 1963, 1970.  
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without the slightest relevance, and are completely absent from the 
minds and the feelings of especially the survivors and victims of 
apartheid – many of whom have retained (within the local horizons that 
are the home of immanentalism) a modicum of knowledge of and of 
allegiance to time-honoured Southern African cultural traditions. (Again 
we must add: “in whatever selected, newly-invented, or perverted way” – 
of course, the point is very sensitive since a major strategy of the 
apartheid state was to justify the spatial, social and constitutional 
distinction between Whites and Blacks, by artificially furthering the 
ethnic distinctions between Black Africans, in a policy of divide and rule 
that, in retrospect, has made any expression of historic local or regional 
cultural identity in South Africa today, suspect as a possible product of 
the apartheid state.) Characteristically, sangomas, although specialists in 
the dynamics of collective healing and reconciliation at the level of the 
kin group and the local community in Southern Africa, were virtually 
absent from the TRC process, whereas the concept of ubuntu was only 





I have attempted to show how the present collection’s project, while at first 
superficial glance appearing to deal with abstruse topics of limited 
applicability (a reading of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in terms of Aristotelian rhetoric), in fact addresses phenomena 
of the greatest significance for the African continent as a whole, thus taking 
up major debates in Quest over the years: the reflection on the philosophical 
canon (in this case: Aristotle and rhetoric); the development of an African 
philosophy that is relevant to major current transformations on the African 
continent – in this case the viability of the state, democracy, reconciliation 
and freedom; that is critically and radically aware of its hegemonic context; 
and that yet situates itself globally, in the field of tension between the 
universal and the particular.  
 In this way, this Postscript both situates, and vindicates, the present 
collection, and offers an manifesto that may serve as Preface for future 
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